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Many observers believe that significant global inte-
gration is under way in the banking industry and that, 
in the coming years, individual banks will expand 
their reach into many countries. Likewise, these 
observers expect that many national banking markets 
will develop large foreign components; as that hap-
pens, the nationality of a bank in such a market will 
matter little to prospective customers. 
[note: 1]. For example, Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, in their 
International Economics: Theory and Policy, 5th ed. (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley, 2000), state that "one of the most pervasive features 
of the commercial banking industry of the 1990s is that banking 
activities have become globalized'' (p. 649). [end of note.] 
These forecasts are based on the observation that, 
over the past two or three decades, many nations 
have removed important regulatory barriers to inter-
national banking. Advances in technology also now 
allow financial institutions to manage larger informa-
tion flows across more locations and to evaluate 
and manage risks at lower costs than ever before. 
Together, these developments have reduced the costs 
of supplying banking services across borders. At the 
same time, growth in the international activities and 
trade of multinational corporations has increased the 
demand for services from financial institutions that 
operate across borders. 
Despite these developments, the banking industry 
appears today to be far from globally integrated, 
particularly in industrialized countries. For example, 
the foreign share of bank assets in most industrialized 
countries remains at or below 10 percent. And 
although bank consolidation has been intense within 
industrialized countries, mergers and acquisitions 
across the borders of these countries have been much 
less common. 
[note: 2]. For the 10 percent figure, see Stijn Claessens, Asli Demirguj-
Kunt, and Harry Huizinga, "How Does Foreign Entry Affect the 
Domestic Banking Market?'' Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 25 
(May 2001), table 1, p. 896. For mergers and acquisitions across 
borders, see Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial 
Sector (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, 2001). [end of note.] 
To evaluate more closely the extent to which bank-
ing is becoming globally integrated, we study the 
nationality and international reach of banks that pro-
vide financial services across Europe to affiliates of 
multinational corporations. We examine these affili-
ates because they are among the customers most 
likely to demand the services of international banks, 
and we focus on Europe because barriers to financial 
integration have been extensively reduced on that 
continent. A finding that banking integration has 
advanced little even under such favorable conditions 
would cast doubt on the prospects for the globaliza-
tion of banking more generally. 
We rely mostly on an extensive, carefully con-
ducted 1996 survey of the short-term banking prac-
tices of more than 2,000 European affiliates of multi-
national corporations. Perhaps surprisingly, we find 
that close to two-thirds of these affiliates choose a 
bank headquartered in the nation in which they are 
operating (a host-nation bank) rather than a bank 
from their home country or a third nation. Moreover, 
having chosen a host-nation bank, an affiliate is more 
likely to select a bank limited to local or regional 
operations rather than a large bank with global reach. 
We also examine time-series data that might reveal 
the degree to which global integration has increased 
over the past decade. These data cover European 
syndicated loans, the ratio of domestic private bank 
claims to total (domestic plus foreign) bank claims, 
and the dispersion of nonfinancial goods prices across 
Europe. In brief, the time-series data show a picture 
for the current period that is not substantially differ-
ent from that at the time of the 1996 survey. 
These results are consistent with the idea that affili-
ates value host-nation banks over others because 
host-nation banks better understand their own market 
and may possess superior information about local 
nonfinancial suppliers and customers. Our results also 
imply that affiliates that have chosen host-nation 
banks value the more customized and relationship-
based services offered by banks with local or regional 
reach, as opposed to the broad-based services offered 
by a host-nation bank that has global reach. Our findings suggest that even as economic forces 
push toward globalization, the high demand for host-
based expertise by bank customers, coupled with the 
competitive advantages that host-nation banks have 
in providing this expertise, implies that many bank-
ing services could very well remain local. In other 
words, banking markets need not become much more 
integrated as the globalization of other economic 
sectors continues. 
FOCUS ON EUROPE. 
Europe is an ideal setting for studying international 
integration because its countries have taken a number 
of steps to reduce regulatory barriers to cross-border 
banking. These steps are known collectively as the 
''single market'' program. 
[note: 3]. Jean Dermine, "Banking in Europe: Past, Present, and Future,'' 
in Vitor Gaspar, Philipp Hartmann, and Olaf Sleijpen, eds., The 
Transformation of the European Financial System, Second ECB Cen-
tral Banking Conference (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 2003) 
pp. 31-116. [end of note.] 
Under this program, the 
European Commission and the European Union (EU) 
Council of Ministers established directives intended 
to guarantee equal regulatory treatment of foreign 
banks by national authorities, unfettered provision of 
financial services across borders, home-country con-
trol of bank supervision, and home-country imple-
mentation of bank solvency requirements. 
[note: 4]. Currently, the fifteen members of the European Union (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom) and the three additional nations of the European 
Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) have agreed to 
abide by the bank-related directives. [end of note.] 
The EU 
Council also passed regulations to liberalize cross-
border capital flows and harmonize regulations across 
member countries that cover capital adequacy, credit 
exposure, and banks' participation in nonfinancial 
activities. Most of these directives had been imple-
mented by the mid-1990s. In 1999, eleven members 
of the EU also entered into the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and began to trade in a single currency, 
the euro. 
[note: 5]. The original EMU members are Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and Spain. On January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth 
country to adopt the euro. [end of note.] 
The EU Council has as one of its goals the creation 
of a single, integrated banking market. An assump-
tion behind such a goal is that cross-border competi-
tion fosters efficient, low-cost banking by allowing 
more efficient banks to move across borders and 
compete with less-efficient banks formerly protected 
by their nation's borders. Competition forces the 
inefficient banks to either improve or to leave the 
market. As the lowest-cost producers of banking ser-
vices expand across many borders, they drive prices 
closer to marginal costs. 
Europe has other characteristics that support finan-
cial integration. The proximity of most of its coun-
tries to each other should keep cross-border transac-
tion costs low. In addition, the countries of western 
Europe are technologically advanced. As of the early 
1990s, they were producing more science and engi-
neering Ph.D.s than either the United States or Asia 
and were spending as much as the United States on 
nondefense-related research and development. 
[note: 6]. National Science Foundation, Human Resources for Science & 
Technology: The European Region, NSF 96-316 (Arlington, Va.: 
NSF, 1996). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, OECD Science and Technology Indicators (Paris: OECD, 1995). [end of note.] 
Even within Europe, however, the evidence sug-
gests that the integration of banking is advancing 
little, if at all. With the exception of the recent 
consolidation across the Nordic countries, bank 
merger and acquisition activity has been minimal 
across European borders. 
[note: 7]. The Nordic countries are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and Sweden. See Claudia M. Buch and Gayle L. Delong, ''Cross-
Border Bank Mergers: What Lures the Rare Animal?'' Journal of 
Banking and Finance (forthcoming); Patrick Beitel and Dirk 
Schiereck, ''Value Creation at the Ongoing Consolidation of the 
European Banking Market,'' Institute for Mergers and Acquisitions, 
working paper; and Steven Ongena, Jason Karceski, and David C. 
Smith, ''The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower 
Welfare,'' International Finance Discussion Papers 679 (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000). [end of note.] 
Remaining informal barriers in Europe could help 
explain this slow pace. One potential barrier is brand 
loyalty to local services. Observers often cite reluc-
tance by bankers in Europe to compete in foreign 
countries in which they believe that loyalty to local 
products is strong. So, for example, Swiss banks do 
little business in Germany, and German banks do 
little business in Switzerland. Yet German and Swiss 
banks both have a strong presence in the United 
States, where loyalty to local brands is viewed as 
less of an issue. National government policies could 
also inhibit cross-border competition. For instance, 
despite an explicit commitment to a level playing 
field, European governments often promote the 
expansion of their own nations' banks through tax 
breaks, subsidies, guarantees, and direct ownership. 
[note: 8]. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer, "Government Ownership of Banks,'' Journal of Finance, 
vol. 57 (February 2002), pp. 265-301. [end of note.] 
We argue that such barriers are not the only expla-
nation for the observed lack of integration in Europe. 
The slow pace of integration could result in large part 
from competitive advantages enjoyed by host-nation 
banks. NATIONALITY AND REACH OF BANKS. 
In a frictionless banking market with no barriers to 
integration, commercial customers will select the 
bank that provides the price, quality, and mix of 
services that will best facilitate their business opera-
tions. Two potentially important criteria for a foreign 
affiliate's choice are the bank's nationality and reach. 
Bank nationality refers to the country in which the 
bank is headquartered. Some affiliates might value 
banking services that require a detailed knowledge 
of the country in which the affiliate operates. Banks 
headquartered in the nation that hosts the affiliate will 
likely have an advantage in offering these services, 
which we term ''host-based'' expertise. So, for exam-
ple, an affiliate of a U.S. corporation operating in 
Germany might choose a German bank because such 
a bank will best understand the culture, business 
practices, and regulatory conditions in Germany. The 
bank may even have unique access to information 
about German nonfinancial suppliers and customers. 
Other affiliates might value a bank that offers 
''home-based'' expertise—that is, an understanding 
of the home market of the affiliate's parent—because 
it is important to the affiliate to rely on a bank 
familiar with its home territory. 
[note: 9]. Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, ''To What Extent Will the 
Banking Industry Be Globalized?'' refer to host-based expertise as 
''concierge'' services and home-based expertise as "home cookin''' 
services. [end of note.] 
Perhaps the bank 
already serves the parent corporation in the home 
country. Banks headquartered in the affiliate' s home 
country should have an advantage in offering home-
based expertise. A U.S. affiliate operating in Ger-
many that values home-based expertise might then 
prefer a U.S. bank because of its advantage in offer-
ing such services. 
Banks from third countries (that is, from neither 
the host nor the home country) may not have host-
based or home-based expertise, but they might com-
petitively offer services in other dimensions valued 
by an affiliate. For instance, a U.S. corporate affiliate 
in Germany may value, say, a Dutch bank for a 
specialized service not offered by host- or home-
nation banks. 
Bank reach refers to the size and geographic scope 
of the bank. Some affiliates may value a large, global 
bank that can offer a broad range of financial ser-
vices, expertise within many foreign markets, supe-
rior risk diversification, and the ability to facilitate 
large deals. For the affiliate operating in Germany, 
this choice need not depend on bank nationality 
because the affiliate could choose a global German 
bank (for example, Deutsche Bank), a global U.S. 
bank (for example, Citibank), or a global third-nation 
bank (for example, the Dutch bank ABN AMRO). 
A different set of affiliates may prefer the advantages 
of a smaller bank that offers services in only a local 
area because such a bank is more likely to establish a 
close relationship with the affiliate and provide cus-
tomized services. Such an affiliate that operates in 
Germany might select a German bank that has a local 
character and operates only in Germany or maybe 
even in only one part of the country. Still other 
affiliates may prefer a bank that blends international 
reach with local, personalized services. Such a bank's 
reach may be limited to a specific region or set of 
countries. So, a U.S. affiliate operating in Germany 
that prefers a blend of the far-reaching services of a 
global bank and the more personalized character of a 
local bank might choose an institution that confines 
itself to operating mainly on the European continent 
(for example, the Nordic-based banking concern 
Nordea). 
In the absence of barriers, the extent of integration 
in the banking industry will depend on how custom-
ers value different banking services and the extent 
to which banks of a given nationality and reach can 
provide those services. Importantly, if customers 
place a high value on global services and have little 
value for host-based or home-based expertise, then 
we might expect to see an integrated banking indus-
try, perhaps with a few global banks dominating 
markets around the world. Conversely, if customers 
value host-based expertise and place less value on 
global services, then we should observe limited bank-
ing industry integration. Thus, depending on the ser-
vices valued by bank customers, we could have a 
world with extensive integration or one with little 
integration. 
In the next section, we use the concepts of bank 
nationality and reach to examine our primary data 
set. 
THE 1996 SURVEY. 
Our main source for connecting foreign affiliates of 
multinational corporations with their banks is 
''GlobalCash-Europe96,'' a survey of the short-term 
banking services provided to large, nonbank corpo-
rations. 
[note: 10]. The objective of the survey is to gather information on the cash 
management practices of corporations. However, the European 
usage of 'cash management'' covers virtually all short-term banking 
services. [end of note.] 
The survey was conducted in 1996 across 
twenty European nations by The Bank Relationship 
Consultancy and the School of Management at the University of Bath, in the United Kingdom. 
[note: 11]. For a detailed description of the survey, see Steven Ongena and 
David C. Smith, "What Determines the Number of Bank Relation-
ships: Cross-country Evidence,'' Journal ofFinancial Intermediation, 
vol. 9 (January 2000), pp. 26-56. [end of note.] 
Short-
term banking services include lending, deposit-
taking, liquidity management, foreign exchange man-
agement, and other financial services that have a time 
horizon of less than one year. A foreign affiliate of a 
corporation can take the form of a subsidiary, branch 
office, sales office, manufacturing plant, or some 
other related entity that requires banking services 
within a given country. 
Responses to the survey were obtained from 1,129 
corporations. These corporations had a total of 2,118 
foreign affiliates operating in twenty countries in 
Europe, or about two affiliates per corporation. The 
parent corporations of most of these affiliates were 
headquartered in Europe, although 24 percent were 
headquartered outside Europe, mostly in the United 
States. 
The survey asked corporations to identify the banks 
their foreign affiliates used for short-term banking 
services within each of the twenty countries. 
[note: 12]. A respondent could identify up to two banks for each 
country—a ''primary'' and ''secondary'' bank. To avoid biases associ-
ated with double counting, we report all sample statistics using only 
the affiliate's primary bank choice. Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, 
''To What Extent Will the Banking Industry Be Globalized?'' find that 
the results reported here are not altered by use of an alternative 
definition that includes a secondary bank. [end of note.] 
The 
nationalities of the sample banks named by the 
respondents were obtained from Fitch IBCA, a data-
base containing information on the ownership struc-
ture of banks. Each bank subsidiary was assumed to 
take on the nationality and reach of its parent. Under 
this assumption, 255 banks provided short-term bank-
ing services for the 2,118 affiliates. 
For each affiliate-bank observation, we identified 
the bank's nationality and reach. For nationality, 
banks are classified as either host-nation, home-
nation, or third-nation banks. A host-nation bank is 
headquartered in the country in which the affiliate 
operates, a home-nation bank is headquartered in the 
same country in which the affiliate's parent is head-
quartered, and a third-nation bank is headquartered in 
neither the home nor host country. 
For reach, banks are classified as global, regional, 
or local. Global banks are defined to have the widest 
reach. They provide services to the affiliates in at 
least nine of the twenty European nations from which 
respondents were drawn and have at least $100 bil-
lion in consolidated assets as of year-end 1995. Local 
banks are defined to have the narrowest reach, pro-
viding services to the affiliates in the European nation 
of their headquarters only and having consolidated 
assets of less than $100 billion. By definition, all 
local banks serve only as host-nation banks. Finally, 
regional banks are defined to have intermediate 
reach. They operate in more than one country or have 
more than $100 billion in assets; but they operate in 
too few countries, or are too small, to be a global 
bank. Of the 255 banks in our sample, 8 are global, 
73 are regional, and the remaining 174 are local. 
By their nature, the bank reach classifications are 
somewhat arbitrary and Eurocentric. For instance, 
banks that have a strong European presence but do 
not operate outside of Europe could be classified as 
''global'' under our system. Nevertheless, all eight 
banks are generally recognized as large, global banks 
(table 1). The findings are materially unchanged 
when the dividing lines between global and regional 
banks and between regional and local banks are 
altered. Overall, we are confident that the results are 
not an artifact of our definition of bank reach. 
Table 1. Banks in the 1996 sample that are defined as having global reach 
Bank name 
Assets worldwide 
(billions of dollars, 
year-end 1995) 
Rank in American Banker, 
by year-end 1995 
worldwide assets 
Number of surveyed 
countries in which the 
bank operates 
Headquarters 
Deutsche Bank  502.3  1  10  Germany 
ABN AMRO  339.4  12  19  Netherlands 
Credit Lyonnais  337.6  13  9  France 
Societe Generale  324.8  17  19  France 
Banque Nationale de Paris  323.5  18  12  France 
Citibank  255.3  28  20  United States 
Bank of America  230.2  34  18  United States 
Chase Manhattan Bank  120.5  62  19  United States 
NOTE. Banks with global reach are defined as those that operate in at least 
nine of twenty European nations and had at least $100 billion in worldwide 
assets as of year-end 1995. 
SOURCE. Allen N. Berger, Qinglei Dai, Steven Ongena, and David C. Smith, 
''To What Extent Will the Banking Industry Be Globalized? A Study of Bank 
Nationality and Reach in 20 European Nations,'' Journal of Banking and 
Finance, vol. 27 (March 2003), table 1, p. 391. 
With respect to bank nationality, we find that 
nearly two-thirds of all affiliates (66 percent) use a 
bank headquartered in the host nation for their short-
term banking services (table 2). The remaining affili-
ates split evenly between using a home-nation bank 
(18 percent) and a third-nation bank (17 percent). 2. Distribution of bank nationality and bank reach, by host nation, 1996 
Percent except as noted 
Host nation 
Total bank 























All  9,563  2,118  65.5  17.7  16.9  35.1  52.8  12.0 
Large banking sector: 
Germany  3,041  240  73.3  14.2  12.5  40.0  49.2  10.8 
Large banking sector: France  1,527  223  76.7  12.1  11.2  66.8  17.0  16.1 
Large banking sector: United Kingdom  1,278  224  52.2  29.0  18.8  25.9  71.9  2.2 
Large banking sector: Italy  831  119  70.6  17.6  11.8  27.7  43.7  28.6 
Large banking sector: Switzerland  557  103  76.7  15.5  7.8  13.6  78.6  7.8 
Large banking sector: Spain  552  126  57.9  26.2  15.9  26.2  54.8  19.0 
Large banking sector: Netherlands  457  166  78.3  11.4  10.2  76.5  21.1  2.4 
Large banking sector: Total  8,241  1,201  69.1  17.9  13.0  42.5  46.1  11.4 
Small banking sector: 
Belgium  389  150  59.3  21.3  19.3  35.3  64.0  .7 
Small banking sector: Austria  297  79  79.7  8.9  11.4  20.3  72.2  7.6 
Small banking sector: Sweden  106  109  85.3  9.2  5.5  11.0  79.8  9.2 
Small banking sector: Norway  95  83  74.7  15.7  9.6  10.8  80.7  8.4 
Small banking sector: Portugal  89  54  51.9  20.4  27.8  27.8  29.6  42.6 
Small banking sector: Finland  88  48  77.1  12.5  10.4  16.7  68.8  14.6 
Small banking sector: Denmark  75  100  85.0  7.0  8.0  12.0  79.0  9.0 
Small banking sector: Greece  47  40  40.0  20.0  40.0  45.0  32.5  22.5 
Small banking sector: Ireland  26  73  56.2  19.2  24.7  21.9  74.0  4.1 
Small banking sector: Luxembourg  13  40  15.0  17.5  67.5  27.5  57.5  15.0 
Small banking sector: Total  1,224  776  67.0  14.8  18.2  21.9  67.7  10.4 
Former Eastern bloc: 
Czech Republic  43  49  28.6  28.6  42.9  42.9  28.6  28.6 
Former Eastern bloc: Poland  36  60  28.3  26.7  45.0  50.0  21.7  28.3 
Former Eastern bloc: Hungary  16  32  18.8  43.8  37.5  40.6  40.6  18.8 
Former Eastern bloc: Total  96  141  26.2  31.2  42.6  45.4  28.4  26.2 
NOTE. Banks are those chosen by affiliates of multinational corporations 
operating in twenty European countries and surveyed in 1996. The banks 
provide short-term banking services to the affiliates that selected them. 
Components may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
1. A host-nation bank is headquartered in the nation in which the affiliate 
operates. 
2. A home-nation bank is headquartered in the same nation in which the 
affiliate's parent is headquartered. 
3. A third-nation bank is headquartered in neither the host nation nor the 
home nation. 
4. A global bank provides services to the affiliates in at least nine of the 
twenty European nations and had at least $100 billion in worldwide assets as of 
year-end 1995. 
5. A regional bank is neither global (is in too few nations or is too small) nor 
local (is in too many nations or is too large). 
6. A local bank provides services to the affiliates only in the European nation 
of the bank's headquarters and had worldwide assets of less than $100 billion as 
of year-end 1995. 
SOURCE. Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, ''To What Extent Will the Bank-
ing Industry Be Globalized?'' table 2, p. 392. 
This pattern suggests that preferences for host-based 
expertise are strong and tend to dominate bank selec-
tions. This finding also contrasts with the perception 
in much of the academic literature that foreign affili-
ates favor their home-nation banks. 
[note: 13]. For example, see Larry G. Goldberg and Anthony Saunders, 
''The Determinants of Foreign Bank Activity in the U.S.,'' Journal 
of Banking and Finance, vol. 15 (March 1981), pp. 17-32; and 
E.C. Kaplanis and Richard A. Brealey, ''The Determination of For-
eign Bank Location,'' Journal of International Money and Finance, 
vol. 15 (August 1996), pp. 577-97. [end of note.] 
With respect to bank reach, about 35 percent of the 
affiliates choose global banks, 53 percent choose 
regional banks, and 12 percent choose local banks. 
These data suggest that while a vast majority of the 
foreign affiliates of multinational corporations prefer 
banks that span multiple nations (that is, global or 
regional banks), only about one-third choose global 
banks. 
We also examine the distribution of bank national-
ity and reach within each of the twenty host coun-
tries, sorted by the total size of the nation's banking 
sector and grouped into one of three categories: large-
banking-sector nation, small-banking-sector nation, 
or former Eastern-bloc nation (table 2). The data 
show that bank nationality choice can differ greatly 
across industrialized host nations, particularly among 
small-banking-sector countries. For instance, only 
15 percent of the affiliates operating in Luxembourg 
use a host-nation bank, whereas about 85 percent of 
those in Sweden do so. We separately consider the 
banking systems of the former Eastern-bloc nations 
because they tend to have legal and financial systems 
that are relatively new compared with those of west-
ern Europe. 
[note: 14]. The former Eastern-bloc countries in the sample are the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. [end of note.] 
Only 26 percent of the affiliates operat-
ing in the former Eastern-bloc nations use a host 
bank; about 43 percent select a bank from a third 
nation. Thus, use of host-nation banks in the former 
Eastern-bloc nations is much less frequent than in the 
industrialized nations of western Europe. The data on bank reach also show considerable 
variation across host nations. Global banks are cho-
sen relatively more frequently in large-banking-sector 
nations (43 percent) and in former Eastern-bloc 
nations (45 percent) than in small-banking-sector 
nations (22 percent). This observed pattern seems to 
indicate that global banks prosper best in markets 
open to bank competition (large-banking-sector 
nations) and in markets with less-established 
banking systems (former Eastern-bloc nations). Also 
notable is the variation in reach among the large-
banking-sector nations. For example, about two-
thirds of the affiliates operating in France use a global 
bank; more than two-thirds of the affiliates operating 
in Switzerland and the United Kingdom use regional 
banks; and more than one-fourth of the affiliates 
operating in Italy use local banks. 
We also examine the distribution of bank 
nationality and reach according to the home nation 
of the affiliate, including countries outside the twenty 
host European nations (table 3). Of the foreign affili-
ates with corporate headquarters in European coun-
tries with both large and small banking sectors, 
70 percent select a host-nation bank and only about 
11 percent opt for a home-nation bank. This result is 
surprising, given that many of the European corpo-
rations have large home-nation banks close by from 
which to choose. In fact, the only outlier home nation 
is the United States. Of the affiliates whose parents 
are headquartered in the United States, 42 percent 
choose home-nation banks, a rate much higher than 
that for affiliates from other countries. This finding 
could reflect the ability of U.S.-owned banks to oper-
ate relatively efficiently in foreign countries, consis-
tent with the academic literature. 
[note: 15]. See Allen N. Berger, Robert DeYoung, Hesna Genay, and 
Gregory F. Udell, ''Globalization of Financial Institutions: Evidence 
from Cross-Border Banking Performance,'' in Robert E. Litan and 
Anthony Santomero, eds., Brookings—Wharton Papers on Financial 
Services (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 23-158. 
[end of note.] 
Table 3. Distribution of bank nationality and bank reach, by home nation, 1996 
Percent except as noted 
Home nation 
Total bank 


















All  22,151  2,118  65.5  17.7  16.9  35.1  52.8  12.0 
Large banking sector: 
Germany  3,041  177  76.8  7.9  15.3  31.6  55.4  13.0 
Large banking sector: France  1,527  50  60.0  26.0  14.0  32.0  54.0  14.0 
Large banking sector: United Kingdom  1,278  364  79.1  6.3  14.6  30.5  57.1  12.4 
Large banking sector: Italy  831  84  54.8  9.5  35.7  36.9  51.2  11.9 
Large banking sector: Switzerland  557  84  63.1  3.6  33.3  48.8  40.5  10.7 
Large banking sector: Spain  552  12  66.7  25.0  8.3  41.7  25.0  33.3 
Large banking sector: Netherlands  457  121  47.1  26.4  26.4  48.8  45.5  5.8 
Large banking sector: Total  8,241  892  69.3  10.8  20.0  35.8  52.5  11.8 
Small banking sector: 
Belgium  389  4  100.0  .0  .0  .0  100.0  .0 
Small banking sector: Austria  297  39  64.1  28.2  7.7  17.9  51.3  30.8 
Small banking sector: Sweden  106  164  73.8  12.8  13.4  21.3  67.7  11.0 
Small banking sector: Norway  95  65  63.1  7.7  29.2  23.1  63.1  13.8 
Small banking sector: Portugal  89  12  25.0  25.0  50.0  58.3  33.3  8.3 
Small banking sector: Finland  88  177  83.1  4.5  12.4  21.5  63.8  14.7 
Small banking sector: Denmark  75  134  70.1  17.9  11.9  17.2  62.7  20.1 
Small banking sector: Greece  47  5  40.0  20.0  40.0  80.0  20.0  .0 
Small banking sector: Ireland  26  100  58.0  9.0  33.0  43.0  47.0  10.0 
Small banking sector: Luxembourg  13  16  81.3  .0  18.8  18.8  62.5  18.8 
Small banking sector: Total  1,224  716  70.9  11.5  17.6  24.4  60.8  14.8 
Former Eastern bloc: 
Czech Republic  43  2  100.0  .0  .0  .0  50.0  50.0 
Former Eastern bloc: Poland  36  2  100.0  .0  .0  50.0  .0  50.0 
Former Eastern bloc: Hungary  16  0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Former Eastern bloc: Total  96  4  100.0  .0  .0  25.0  25.0  50.0 
Other: 
Japan  6,746  9  77.8  .0  22.2  33.3  44.4  22.2 
Other: United States  5,012  470  49.1  41.7  9.1  51.1  41.7  7.2 
Other: Canada  408  22  72.7  .0  27.3  18.2  59.1  22.7 
Other: Other  422  5  60.0  .0  40.0  40.0  40.0  20.0 
Other: Total  12,588  506  50.8  38.7  10.5  49.2  42.5  8.3 
NOTE. See notes to table 2. n.a. Not applicable. 
Although bank nationality and reach are two dis-
tinct concepts, they can be related. For instance, we 
have already seen that banks with local reach have, 
by definition, host-nation nationality. Other depen-
dencies may result from how banks with a given 
reach are distributed across countries. For example, 
some countries do not have a global bank headquar-
tered within their borders. Banks in these countries cannot offer both host-based expertise and global 
services to affiliates that value such a combination. 
Likewise, banks from these countries cannot jointly 
offer home-based and global services to affiliates of 
native corporations operating abroad. Finally, some 
banking systems may be too new or undeveloped to 
offer competitive banking services at even a local 
level. 
We study potential dependencies between bank 
nationality and reach by assuming that bank reach 
depends first on the selection of bank nationality. We 
reason that, in the absence of barriers to integration, a 
bank's reach will be limited by the extent to which 
customers value cross-border banking relations. For 
example, in the extreme case that all bank customers 
selected host-nation banks for all of their services, 
there would be no need for banks with global reach. 
A two-stage decision tree illustrates our framework 
(diagram 1). In the first stage, an affiliate decides on 
bank nationality; in the second stage, it chooses bank 
reach. Note that by definition, a local bank does not 
arise as a second-stage choice when an affiliate 
chooses a home-nation or third-nation bank in the 
first stage. At the nodes of the top branches of the 
tree, we report the sample frequencies for selecting 
a host-nation, home-nation, and third-nation bank, 
while at the bottom branch nodes, we report the 
sample frequencies for selecting a global, regional, 
and local bank given the prior choice of bank 
nationality. 
Diagram 1. Distribution of bank nationality and bank reach in a two-stage decision tree 
[at the top is the Total Sample: 2118 affiliates in twenty European nations.  The three branches below are in the Bank Nationality section and they are: Host 65.5% (1387 affiliates),  Home 17.7% (374 affiliates), and Third 16.8% (357 affiliates).  The branches below them are in the Bank Reach section. Host has three branches: Global 20.5% (285 affiliates),  Regional 61.1% (847 affiliates), and Local 18.4% (255 affiliates). Home has two branches: Global 62.3%  (233 affiliates) and Regional 37.7% (141 affiliates). Third has two branches: Global 63.3% (266 affiliates) and  Regional 36.7% (131 affiliates).] 
NOTE. See notes to table 2. By definition, a local bank does not arise as a 
second-stage choice when an affiliate chooses a home-nation or third-nation 
bank. 
As shown earlier, almost two-thirds of the affiliates 
use host-nation banks over home- and third-nation 
banks (table 2), a pattern consistent with strong host-
based expertise. Affiliates' choices for bank reach 
differ greatly, depending on bank nationality (dia-
gram 1). After selecting a host-nation bank, about 
21 percent of the affiliates use a global bank. By 
comparison, of affiliates that select either a home-
nation or third-nation bank, about 63 percent use 
a global bank. In other words, affiliates tend to use 
banks with global reach once they choose a home-
nation or third-nation bank, but they tend to use a 
regional or local bank once they choose a host-nation 
bank. 
One aspect of the data that could be driving these 
patterns is that, as of 1996, only three host nations— 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands—had a global 
bank headquartered within their borders. That is, 
affiliates choosing a host-nation bank in any of the 
other seventeen nations in our sample could not also 
select a global bank. This limitation could simply 
reflect an equilibrium outcome—that is, the demand 
for global services within these countries is not great 
enough to induce a host-nation bank to expand its 
reach globally or to induce an existing global bank 
to move its headquarters to one of these countries. 
Alternatively, this outcome could reflect supply con-
ditions in the host nation. 
We look more closely at Germany to gain some 
insight into how the distribution of bank choices might differ in a market in which all types of banks 
are available (diagram 2). Germany not only has a 
host-nation bank that is global (Deutsche Bank), but 
it also has three strong nationwide systems of local 
and regional commercial banks from which affili-
ates may choose: the Landesbanken (state banks), 
Sparkassen (savings banks), and Hypothekbanken 
(building societies). 
Diagram 2. Distribution of bank nationality and bank reach in Germany in a two-stage decision tree 
[at the top is the Total Sample: 240 affiliates in Germany.  The three branches below are in the Bank Nationality section and they are: Host 73.3% (176 affiliates),  Home 14.2% (34 affiliates), and Third 12.5% (30 affiliates).  The branches below them are in the Bank Reach section. Host has three branches: Global 34.1% (60 affiliates),  Regional 14.8% (26 affiliates), and Local 51.1% (90 affiliates). Home has two branches: Global 55.9%  (19 affiliates) and Regional 44.1% (15 affiliates). Third has two branches: Global 56.7% (17 affiliates) and  Regional 43.3% (13 affiliates).] 
The German data in diagram 2 suggest that the 
supply conditions alone do not create the patterns 
shown in diagram 1. A substantial proportion of the 
foreign affiliates operating in Germany still select a 
host-nation (that is, German) bank for their banking 
services. More important, if they choose a German 
bank, affiliates choose a regional or local bank over a 
global bank by a two-to-one margin; whereas, if they 
choose a home-nation or third-nation bank, most 
affiliates then choose a global bank. 
The cross-country variation in bank nationality and 
reach was analyzed more formally using a regression 
model that attempted to control for the demand and 
supply factors within host nations, the geographic, 
cultural, and financial differences between host and 
home nations, and the attributes of a foreign affili-
ate's parent corporation. 
[note: 16]. Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, ''To What Extent Will the 
Banking Industry Be Globalized?'' [end of note.] 
The regression analysis 
confirmed the importance of host-nation-based exper-
tise in the choice of bank. An additional finding was 
that host-nation banks are less likely to be chosen in 
the former Eastern-bloc countries, and home-nation 
banks typically fill the void left by the host-nation 
banks in these countries. We speculate that the bank-
ing systems within these countries are not yet 
developed enough to offer competitive host-based 
expertise. 
One limitation of the 1996 survey evidence is that 
it offers only a ''snapshot'' of the provision of bank-
ing services rather than a picture of the evolution of 
banking markets over time. Moreover, the snapshot 
was seven years ago; significant integration could 
have occurred since that time. 
A LOOK AT THE TIME-SERIES DATA. 
We begin our time-series analysis with two measures 
of banking industry integration for the period from 
1992 to 2002. The first measure is the proportion of 
syndicated loans that host-nation banks provide to 
European affiliates of multinational corporations. 
That is, we start with the same types of affiliates as 
examined in the previous section, but we now track 
the nationality of those banks that provide syndicated 
loans to the affiliates. 
The syndicated loan market is a popular mecha-
nism for extending loans to medium-sized and large 
borrowers and is often thought to be the most glo-
bally integrated sector of the banking industry. Our 
measure is constructed from Loanware, a database 
that tracks syndicated loan agreements from around 
the world. 
[note: 17]. Loanware is a product of Dealogic, Ltd. A syndicated loan 
agreement is a loan contract between a borrower and a group ofbanks, 
typically headed by a ''lead'' or ''arranging'' bank or group of banks. [end of note.] 
For the 1992-2002 period, we review 1,556 syndicated loans to foreign affiliates of multi-
national corporations operating in Europe. 
The degree of integration as measured by the pro-
portion of syndicated loans financed by host-nation 
banks did not increase over the past decade (chart 1). 
In 1992, host-nation banks financed 35 percent of the 
syndicated loans; in 2002, they financed the same 
proportion. Since 1996, the proportion of host-nation 
banks financing syndicated loans has fluctuated 
between 39 percent and 21 percent. Thus, the syndi-
cated loan data provide no evidence to suggest that 
the level of bank integration has changed much since 
the 1996 survey. 
Chart 1. Indicators of banking market integration in Europe, 
1992-2002 
[This chart has two graphs: Share of syndicated loans provided by host  nation banks, and Share of total bank claims that are domestic.  Top panel: share of syndicated loans provided by host-nation banks.  The graph starts 1992 at about 36%, then goes down to about 27% in  1997. In 1998 it is up to about 40%, then down to about 20% by 2001.  it ends 2002 at about 36%.  Bottom panel: share of total bank claims that are domestic. It starts 1992  at about 78% and slopes down through the graph to about 70% in 2002.] 
SOURCE. For top panel, see text note 17; for bottom panel, see text note 18. 
The syndicated loan data suffer from a potential 
drawback. If the syndicated loan market was already 
fully integrated in 1992, then one might not expect 
it to change much over the decade. Indeed, we see 
that by 1992 foreign banks (home- and third-nation 
banks) already covered roughly two-thirds of the 
loans provided to foreign affiliates (chart 1, top 
panel), which might be close to full integration. 
Another measure of integration that provides a 
more general assessment of changes through time is 
the share of total private bank debt claims (domestic 
and foreign) that are claims on domestic customers. 
This measure is calculated for banks residing in 
twelve countries in western Europe (Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom), plus Canada, Japan, and the 
United States. 
[note: 18]. ''Claims'' refer to loans, notes, and equity claims that banks 
hold against customers. Foreign claims refer to claims on customers 
outside of a bank's resident country. Foreign claims are obtained from 
the Bank for International Settlements' locational statistiscs through 
www.bis.org. To avoid the double counting of claims against subsidi-
aries, we subtract local office claims from total foreign bank claims. 
Private domestic bank claims are from the International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics. [end of note.] 
We interpret a decline in the share of domestic 
bank claims to total bank claims as an increase in the 
level of integration. The proportion has fallen some-
what over the past decade (chart 1, bottom panel). It 
hovered around 78 percent from 1992 through 1995 
and then began to decline slowly. By 2002, the pro-
portion had fallen to 70 percent. This decrease indi-
cates that banks have increased their foreign claims 
over the past decade slightly faster than the rate at 
which they expanded their domestic claims. 
We provide one more piece of time-series evidence 
on the progress of integration, and that is the pace of 
price convergence across countries. John Rogers uses 
a comprehensive and detailed set of prices for 139 
nonfinancial consumer goods in twenty-five Euro-
pean cities from 1990 to 2001 to measure the speed at 
which prices converged as barriers to cross-border 
trade were diminished within Europe. 
[note: 19]. John H. Rogers, ''Monetary Union, Price Level Convergence, 
and Inflation: How Close is Europe to the United States?'' Interna-
tional Finance Discussion Papers 740 (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2002). [end of note.] 
Rogers com-
pares the dispersion of prices in European cities, 
including a subset of cities within the eleven original 
countries of the EMU, to the dispersion of prices for 
a similar set of goods across cities within the United 
States. 
[note: 20]. Price dispersion is defined as the cross-city standard deviation 
of a product's price (calculated after normalizing the price by the 
average price of the product). [end of note.] 
By 1996, the dispersion in prices across 
the European countries had narrowed significantly 
(chart 2). In fact, prices within the EMU countries 
had converged to a degree comparable to that 
observed in the United States. Most of the conver-
gence occurred in the earlier part of the period, with 
little or no further convergence occurring after 1996. 
In sum, the various sets of time-series data exam-
ined here suggest that little further integration has 
occurred in Europe since our sample was collected 
in 1996, although the BIS banks claims statistics suggest that banks have expanded somewhat across 
borders since 1999. 
Chart 2. Price dispersion for traded goods in Europe and the 
United States, 1990-2001 
[graph plotting three lines: selected european countries,  EMU-11, and United States.  Selected European Countries starts 1990 at about 22%,  then goes down until 1993 where it its about 14% where  it stays until 1994, then it goes up to about 16% in 1995,  then down to about 12% in 1998 and stays around there  until 2001.  EMU-11 starts 1990 at about 17%, then goes down to about  9% in 1993, then up to about 11% in 1995, then down to  about 7.5% in 2002.  United States starts 1990 at about 7%, then slowly tends  upwards reaching about 9% in 2001.] 
NOTE. The EMU-11 consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
The selected European countries are the EMU-11, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. For definition of price dispersion, see text note 20. 
SOURCE. John H. Rogers, "Monetary Union, Price Level Convergence, and 
Inflation: How Close Is Europe to the United States?" International Finance 
Discussion Papers 740 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2002). 
SUMMARY. 
The barriers to global integration in the banking 
industry have been significantly reduced over the past 
two decades. Among the contributing factors have 
been the lifting of regulatory restrictions on cross-
border banking, technological advances that allow for 
better management of financial institutions across 
borders, and increases in nonfinancial activities that 
create demands for international banking services. 
Despite these reduced barriers, the integration of the 
banking industry in most developed countries has 
fallen far short of the expectations of many observers. 
Some potentially powerful market forces based on 
the competitive advantages of domestic and foreign 
banks may help explain the lack of an advance in 
global banking. We argue that foreign banking orga-
nizations may be at significant competitive dis-
advantages in providing the price, quality, and mix of 
services that best suit bank customers, and that such 
disadvantages may limit the integration of the bank-
ing industry. 
Our main findings, which are based on a 1996 
cross-section of European affiliates of multinational 
corporations, suggest that almost two-thirds of these 
affiliates receive short-term banking services from a 
bank headquartered in the affiliate's host nation. This 
result is consistent with a strong host-based-expertise 
effect, in which host-nation banks have significant 
competitive advantages in understanding the culture, 
business practices, and regulatory conditions of the 
host nation. However, in the former Eastern-bloc 
nations, the data suggest that only about one-fourth 
of these same types of affiliates are served by host-
nation banks. This finding is consistent with the 
possibility that host-nation banks in these nations 
are not equipped to provide the package of banking 
services that would give them an advantage over 
foreign institutions. 
We also examine three sets of time-series data on 
the progress of integration in Europe from 1992 to 
2002. The main purpose is to explore the possibility 
that our '' snapshot'' of banking as of 1996 might 
have predated significant advances in the integration 
of the European banking industry. We show data on 
the changes in (1) the proportions of the syndicated 
loan market that are underwritten by domestic banks, 
(2) the changes in the proportions of total bank 
claims that are held by domestic banks, and (3) the 
convergence of prices of consumer goods across 
Europe. These data suggest that, if anything, most 
of the effects of the reduced barriers had already 
occurred by 1996. 
Overall, the findings suggest that domestic banks 
possess some competitive advantages that may sig-
nificantly limit the global integration of the banking 
industry. In industrialized nations, domestically based 
institutions appear likely to retain significant market 
shares for some financial services that could poten-
tially be provided by foreign institutions, even when 
the barriers to bank integration have declined dra-
matically. In contrast, foreign banks may obtain much 
higher shares in some less-industrialized nations 
because of competitive advantages over domestic 
institutions that are less well developed. 